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Abstract: 
 
This paper is built upon the predictions of the catering theory of dividends and examines 
whether investor sentiments exert significant influence on corporate dividend policy.  
Accordingly, we propose a dividend model that incorporates a variable at the firm-level 
proxy for the catering effect.  
Estimation of the model using the GMM shows that firms in Eurozone countries cater to their 
investors’ sentiments, and the model provides evidence supporting the catering model.  
Additionally, we show an interaction effect between catering and firm characteristics, 
particularly liquid assets, investment opportunities, and levels of free cash flow. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Corporate dividend policy has long been an issue of interest in the financial literature 
and, despite the vast body of research on the topic, it remains an open subject to 
debate. In fact, since the Miller and Modigliani (1961) irrelevance proposition, 
according to which dividend policies are all equivalent and there is no a policy that 
can increase shareholder wealth in perfect capital markets, many scholars have 
offered alternative explanations for dividends in imperfect markets. Despite the vast 
and mainly US-based literature on this issue2, there is no definitive answer as to why 
investors demand dividends. 
 
One of the most recent arguments that cast doubt on shareholders being indifferent 
about receiving dividends is based on the behavioral finance literature. According to 
this literature, investors’ psychological characteristics influence conduct in financial 
markets, and investors’ irrational behavior limits the effectiveness of arbitration 
actions. In fact, models of behavioral finance (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001; Ritter 
2003; Subrahmanyam, 2007) explain the excess volatility and predictability of stock 
market prices by breaking with the complete rationality hypothesis underlying 
traditional finance. Within this context, some of the most prominent explanations are 
based on investor sentiment (Barberis et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 1998; Hong and 
Stein, 1999; Lamont and Stein, 2006; Coval et al., 2008; Kurov, 2008; Vieira, 2011; 
Bathia and Bredin, 2013).  
 
Explanations for the tendency to pay dividends in equilibrium clientele theory were 
first offered by Miller and Modigliani (1961), and Black and Scholes (1974). This 
theory suggests that changes in dividend policies correspond with changes in 
investor demand for dividends. 
 
Furthermore, firms have become less likely to pay dividends beyond what could be 
expected given the changes in their characteristics such as size, profitability and 
growth opportunities. In fact, Fama and French (2001) find that the decline in the 
proportion of dividend-paying US firms is not satisfactorily explained by changes in 
their characteristics and, consequently, that the dividend decision is not entirely 
explained by the individual characteristics of each firm. Several authors propose 
alternative explanations for this decline in the propensity to pay dividends. For 
instance, Banerjee et al. (2007) argue that transaction cost–based clientele effects 
account for a significant part of the decline in the propensity to pay dividends. 
Amihud and Li (2006) also document the phenomenon called “disappearing 
dividends” by Fama and French (2001), which describes the decrease in the 
information content of dividends since the mid 1970s, making firms less willing to 
incur the costs associated with dividend signaling. DeAngelo et al. (2004) base their 
                                                          
2See, for instance, Fama and French (2001); Koch and Sun (2004); DeAngelo, DeAngelo, 
and Skinner (2004); Allen and Michaley (2003); Brav, et al. (2005); DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo (2006, 2007); Boudoukh, et al. (2007); Li and Zhao (2008) or Skinner (2008). 
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explanation of the disappearing dividends phenomenon on the concentration of 
dividends in top payers among US firms, as well as on the decline in the frequency 
of special dividend payments over the last two decades. Brav et al. (2005) find that 
the higher flexibility of stock repurchases led managers to favor them over 
dividends, a result corroborated by Skinner (2008). 
 
Interestingly, recent non-US based evidence confirms patterns of dividend payments 
found in the US. For instance, Denis and Osobov (2008) examine the dividend 
policies of firms headquartered in the US, the UK, Canada, France, Germany and 
Japan, and find a declining propensity to pay dividends in all these countries. Von 
Eije and Megginson (2008) also find that dividend payments in European Union 
member countries are similar in many ways to those of American firms.  
 
The most innovative and pioneering explanation for the decline in the payment of 
dividends have its roots in the catering theory of dividends proposed by Baker and 
Wurgler (2004a). These authors provide empirical evidence that changes in the 
amounts that firms pay in dividends can be explained by what they term “catering 
incentives,” that is, a measure of market desire for dividend-paying stocks.  
 
The catering theory holds that firms adjust their dividend payouts largely in response 
to investor demand for dividend-paying stocks. The growing interest in this new 
theory of dividends suggests the need to better understand its implications and to 
integrate investor sentiment into dividend models. In fact, whether there is a catering 
effect on a firm’s payout ratio is, as far as we know, an unresolved question, and 
research on investor sentiment carried out in the last decade some mixed results in 
this regard.  
 
For example, Baker and Stein (2003) find that investor sentiment measures are 
highly correlated with, and have predictive power for, future market returns. Wang 
et al. (2006) detect influence from market returns as well as from volatility on future 
values through sentiment measures. Kumar and Lee (2006) rely on the clientele 
model derived by Barberis et al. (2005) to test the effect of individual investor 
sentiment on groups of stocks and find that the returns of individual stocks capture 
the divergent sentiments of various important investor groups. Li and Lie (2006) 
further extend and provide support for the catering theory of dividends, and Ferris et 
al. (2006) find that catering incentives have an important influence on the propensity 
to pay dividends in the UK.  
 
Moreover, Bulan et al. (2007) evidence that catering incentives explain in partly 
timing of the dividends initiation. On the contrary, Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) or  
Kuo  et al. (2013) shows that dividend premium loses its explanatory power calling 
into question the presence of catering incentives. Also, Ferris et al. (2009) find no 
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evidence on the presence of catering incentives in corporate decisions for civil law 
countries3. 
 
As we can see the results are mixed and/or inconclusive, and the empirical evidence 
found is somewhat in conflict with that of the US. For instance, Denis and Osobov 
(2008) find a declining propensity to pay dividends in France and Germany, which is 
entirely explained by firm size, profitability, growth opportunities, and the ratio of 
retained earnings to total equity. They conclude that this result supports the agency 
cost model over the catering theory model. Similarly, Von Eije and Megginson 
(2008) find no systematic effects from a country-specific catering variable in the 15 
countries of the European Union, which suggests that catering “a priori” is not an 
important factor influencing European payout policies. These authors conclude, 
however, that further research is required to learn whether the catering theory is 
relevant in European countries. 
 
With this need in mind, this paper relies on the assumptions of the catering theory 
and attempts to empirically validate this strand of the literature in Eurozone member 
countries. In this way, this paper advances the dividend literature in four directions.  
 
First, we offer new evidence on the determinants of corporate dividend policy by 
focusing on the catering effect associated with investor sentiment. Given the 
controversy surrounding this matter, it is of interest to further investigate and make 
clear the role of catering incentives in dividend policies.  
 
Second, we investigate how the dividend-catering relationship is moderated by firm 
characteristics, such as the level of liquid assets, investment opportunities, and free 
cash flow.  
 
Third, the choice of Eurozone countries as the base of our study is significant 
because previous research on this topic is mainly US-based and, in general, offers 
support to the catering theory of dividends (see references above).  However, recent 
Eurozone evidence (Denis and Osobov, 2008; Von Eije and Megginson, 2008; Ferris 
et al., 2009; Kuo  et al., 2013) is somewhat conflicting in that it suggests a lack of a 
catering effect in European firms’ dividend policies. This paper thus investigates 
whether firms in the Eurozone cater to their investors’ sentiments, as their US 
counterparts are shown to do. 
 
Fourth, studying dividend policies in Europe is interesting for several reasons, as 
pointed out by Von Eije and Megginson (2008) in their European Union study4. 
                                                          
3More evidence on the relevance of investor sentiment in various contexts is provided in 
Edmans, Garcia, and Norli (2007), Boot, Gopalan and Thakor (2008); De Jong, Duca, and 
Dutordoir (2013) or Manconi and Massa (2013), among others. 
4They mention, for instance, the largely segmented corporate governance systems, taxation 
regimes and financial markets among these countries, and the fact that, despite most of them 
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Finally, we avoid obtaining biased results in our study by solving the problem of 
censure of the dependent variable in our model. Note that the payout ratio is a 
censured variable in that some firms pay dividends, whereas others do not, a 
problem that is overcome by estimating a Tobit model that yields a prediction of the 
payout ratio. 
 
We propose a new empirical approach that allows us to measure investor sentiment 
at the firm level, and this is which most distinguishes this paper from the above 
works. If a firm’s market value is mainly explained by its investment, financing and 
dividend decisions, hence the residual value captured by the error term of the 
valuation model should be a measure that serves as a proxy for the firm’s investor 
sentiment. This variable representing the catering effect is then entered a dividend 
model built on the main contributions from previous research.  
 
The estimation of our dividend model by using the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) on a sample of firms from Eurozone countries provides interesting results. 
Consistent with catering arguments, our findings reveal that investor sentiment 
significantly affects a firm’s propensity to pay dividends and, as expected, this effect 
is positive. That is, investor demand for dividends encourages firms to increase their 
payouts.  
 
Additionally, our study provides further evidence on the moderating role of certain 
firm characteristics on the relation between dividends and investor sentiment. 
Specifically, we find that investor sentiment positively impacts dividends of firms 
with high liquid assets. Furthermore, our results reveal a positive catering effect only 
for firms with valuable investment opportunities. Finally, we show that the catering 
effect is significantly larger in firms with higher levels of free cash flow. 
 
Section 2 introduces a theoretical framework that takes account of the existing 
literature and the empirical evidence on traditional explanations of dividends, as well 
as on the catering theory, and presents our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data 
and variables used in our analysis. In Section 4, we present our model of dividends 
and discuss the estimation method. The results are discussed in Section 5, and 
Section 6 presents our conclusions. 
 
2. Theories and Hypotheses 
 
In this section, we first summarize the main contributions from previous research to 
the debate on the determinants of dividend payments, and we propose our 
hypotheses concerning these traditional theories of dividends. We next discuss the 
                                                                                                                                                      
sharing a civil foundation of their laws, some of them (such as Ireland in our sample) have 
common law codes. Note that there is a difference between their study and ours, since some 
European Union members retain their own currencies throughout their study period while 
all the Eurozone member countries adopted the euro after 1999. 
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key arguments of the catering theory of dividends, which leads us to our hypothesis 
about the effect of a firm’s investor sentiment on its payout ratio. 
 
Traditional theories of dividends: 
According to Jensen`s (1986) free cash flow theory, if a firm has cash flow not 
consumed by positive net present value (NPV) projects, it is better to return the 
excess cash to shareholders in order to maximize their wealth and to reduce the 
possibility of these funds being wasted by managers in negative NPV projects. This 
theory thus predicts that higher free cash flow should lead to higher dividend 
payments to prevent firms from overinvesting.5   
 
The positive relationship between dividends and free cash flow is supported by, for 
instance, Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1993), and Holder et al. (1998). DeAngelo et al. 
(2004) show that overinvestment processes worsen in firms that accumulate high 
proportions of cash and distribute low dividends. In the same vein, Miguel et al. 
(2005) document the role played by dividends in controlling overinvestment 
processes in firms with high levels of free cash flow. Consistent with Jensen’s 
(1986) theory and subsequent empirical evidence, the following hypothesis is posed: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between a firm’s free cash flow and its 
payout ratio. 
 
The financial literature widely supports the role played by debt and dividends as 
agency-cost control mechanisms, as they solve the conflict of interest between 
owners and managers (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Jensen, 1986; Rozeff, 1982; 
Jensen, 1986), and they mitigate asymmetries of information between firms and 
potential investors (Ross, 1977; Harris and Raviv, 1991; Lintner, 1956; 
Bhattacharya, 1979’ Li and Zhao, 2008). This literature suggests that debt and 
dividends may be somehow related, although the literature in general is not 
unanimous about the way in which they are related.  
 
On the one hand, the search for a trade-off between costs and benefits leads to a 
substitution hypothesis based on the minimization of agency conflict without 
duplicating efforts (Easterbrook, 1984; John and Senbert, 1998). In others words, 
this hypothesis holds that high leverage makes dividends less valuable, and vice 
versa.6 On the other hand, the alternative hypothesis points to the complementary 
                                                          
5The overinvestment hypothesis has been confirmed from different perspectives in, for 
instance, Chen and Ho (1997); Chakraborty, Kazarosian, and Trahan (1999); Del Brio, 
Perote, and Pindado (2003); Morgado and Pindado (2003) or Fangjian (2010). 
6Subsequent empirical evidence on the substitutability of debt and dividends as cash flow 
commitments can be found in Moh´d, Perry, and Rimbey (1995, 1998), and Von Eije and 
Megginson (2008), who assumed that leverage may help control agency costs, thus reducing 
the need to distribute cash to shareholders through dividends. According to this view, 
leverage and cash distributions will be substitutes and a negative relationship between cash 
dividends and debt ratios is predicted. 
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use of several mechanisms as the most effective solution to a firm’s inefficiencies, 
because no one of them can be a satisfactory solution in itself without generating 
additional costs (Jensen, 1989).7 These two opposing arguments lead us to pose the 
following two alternative hypotheses about the relationship between debt and 
dividends: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: A negative relationship between a firm’s leverage and its payout 
ratio is expected (considering debt as a substitute for dividends). 
 
Hypothesis 2b: A positive relationship between a firm’s leverage and its payout ratio 
is expected (considering debt and dividends as complementary mechanisms). 
 
Lintner (1956) argues that firms seek to maintain dividend stability, and he finds that 
a firm’s earnings are probably the key factor to account for to follow a stable 
dividend pattern. Accordingly, regular dividends represent an ongoing commitment 
to distribute cash and, more importantly, a commitment that managers are especially 
averse to break (Lintner, 1956; Brav et al., 2005).  
 
Consistent with Lintner’s arguments, Benartzi et al. (1997) find that changes in 
dividends are highly correlated with past and current changes in earnings. Along the 
same line of reasoning, Allen et al. (2000) argue that managers need to explain the 
reasons for their actions to shareholders and must base their explanations on simple 
and observable indicators, particularly the level of earnings. More evidence on 
earnings being a determinant of dividends can be found in, for instance, Nissim and 
Ziv (2001); DeAngelo et al. (2004); Koch and Sun (2004); Denis and Osobov (2008) 
and Skinner (2008). 
 
Accordingly, we expect firms to adjust their payout ratios to sudden unexpected 
increases in earnings, and the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the earnings, the higher the payout ratio. 
 
Consistent with the literature (Allen and Michaely, 2003; Aivazian et al., 2003), the 
nature of a firm’s assets influences its dividend policy. Specifically, gross, regular, 
and non-regular dividend payments are found to be positively related to asset 
tangibility on the basis that greater tangibility of a firm’s assets facilitates its access 
to public markets, and it thus increases the likelihood that the firm follows Lintner’s 
pattern of dividend policy. Specifically, Aivazian et al. (2003) show that the 
probability that a firm pays dividends increases with the tangibility of its assets.  
 
                                                          
7 Consistent with this hypothesis, the results in Eckbo and Verma (1994) show a positive and 
significant relationship between debt and dividends and, , Zwiebel (1996) and Douglas 
(2001) confirm that firm value is optimized only when debt and dividends are simultaneously 
used. 
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Additionally, as Barclay et al. (1995) point out, the nature of a firm’s assets affects 
both its financing decision making and its dividend policy. Firms with tangible 
assets can generally more easily access the long-term debt market due to the 
existence of collateral and the consequent ability to secure debt (Scott, 1977). One 
would therefore expect firms with a high proportion of tangible assets to be more 
leveraged, which in turn would affect dividend payments negatively if Hypothesis 2a 
holds, or positively if Hypothesis 2b is supported. Therefore, two alternative 
hypotheses concerning the effect of the nature of a firm’s assets on its payout ratio 
should be posed: 
 
Hypothesis 4a: Firms with a high proportion of tangible fixed assets have lower 
payout ratios (relying on the substitution effect predicted in Hypothesis 2a). 
 
Hypothesis 4b: Firms with a high proportion of tangible fixed assets have higher 
payout ratios (relying on the complementarity effect predicted in Hypothesis 2b). 
 
Finally, a firm’s size has traditionally been considered among the determinants of its 
dividend policy, and previous evidence seems to confirm that larger firms pay higher 
dividends. There are several arguments justifying the positive relationship between 
size and payout ratio. For instance, larger firms enjoy better access to the capital 
markets and, consequently, are less financially constrained, which allows them to 
pay higher dividends (Holder et al. 1998; Twite, 2001).  
 
Additionally, larger firms are usually mature firms with limited growth opportunities 
that are prone to paying more dividends to avoid overinvestment (Barclay et al., 
1995). Accordingly, Fama and French (2001) show that the largest US firms have 
higher payout ratios. More recently, Denis and Osobov (2008) provide evidence of 
the positive relationship between the likelihood of paying dividends and size. This 
leads to our next hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The larger the firm the higher the payout ratios. 
 
The Catering theory of dividends: 
The characteristics of firms that pay dividends (that is, their levels of free cash flow, 
leverage, earnings, tangible fixed assets, and size) should not be separately analyzed 
from certain psychological components, in that an important part of the decision to 
pay dividends may stem from a firm’s desire to satisfy investor expectations. This 
psychological component of dividends is explicitly accounted for in the clientele 
theory. For instance, Shefrin and Statman (1984) extend the work of Thaler and 
Shefrin (1981) and develop the “behavioural life cycle” theory of dividends that 
relies on psychological reasons to explain why investors prefer dividends over 
capital gains.  
 
Allen and Michaely (2003) argue that the clientele effects are the very reason for the 
presence of dividends because, as found by Allen et al. (2000), firms paying 
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dividends attract relatively more institutional investors and perform better. Polk and 
Sapienza (2004; 2009), Baker et al. (2003), Ferreira et al. (2010) also rely on 
behavioral explanations when analyzing the clientele effect. 
 
As we can see, theoretical and empirical dividend models are increasingly 
incorporating the principles of behavioral finance. Relying on behavioral arguments, 
Baker and Wurgler (2004a) develop a theory according to which firms cater to their 
investors’ preferences8 such that they pay dividends when dividend payers trade at a 
premium, and do not pay dividends when dividend payers trade at a discount. These 
authors find an answer as to why no consensus has been reached in the literature 
about dividends. Specifically, they argue that while the dividend decision may be 
very important, it is even more important to base the direction of this decision on the 
prevailing investor sentiment. This argument strongly supports the catering theory of 
dividends, a new theory according to which investors have sentiments about 
dividends. 
 
Providing empirical support for this theory, Baker and Wurgler (2004b) show that 
changes in payout ratios can be explained in terms of what firms denominate as 
“catering incentives,” that is, a measure of market desire for dividend-paying stocks. 
Specifically, they find a connection between the tendency to pay dividends and 
catering incentives. These authors use a market-level variable, the “dividend 
premium,” as a proxy for the value that the market places on dividends (i.e., the 
premium that investors are willing to pay for dividend-paying stocks).  
 
The impact of this variable on the decision to initiate dividend payments shows that 
changes in a firm’s dividend policy may capture changes in investor sentiment about 
dividend-paying firms relative to their sentiment about nonpaying firms. Based on 
this finding, these authors develop a behavioral model, according to which the stock 
price premium carried by dividend-payers explains the decision on whether to pay 
dividends. Baker and Wurgler (2004b) measure relative investor sentiment about 
dividend-paying firms by using the difference between the logarithm of the book-
value-weighted average market-to-book ratio for dividend payers, and the book-
value-weighted average market-to-book ratio for non-payers. They find a positive 
relationship between the catering incentives, captured by the dividend premium, and 
the change in firms’ propensity to pay dividends. Relying on this new view of 
dividends, we take a step forward and propose a measure of catering incentives at 
the firm level. Therefore, our last hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 6: A firm’s payout ratio is positively driven by catering incentives. 
 
                                                          
8According to Baker and Wurgler (2004a), the catering theory and the clientele theory differ 
in that dividends had never been explored via investor sentiment before. Another difference 
is that the catering theory focuses more on the global level of dividends as the result of the 
demand for shares that pay dividends. 
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3. Data and Variables 
 
Data: 
To test the hypotheses posed in the previous section, we use data from several 
Eurozone countries. We selected an international database, World scope, as our 
source of information. Additionally, international data such as the growth of capital 
goods prices, the rate of interest on short-term debt, and the rate of interest on long-term 
debt, are extracted from the Main Economic Indicators published by the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
 
For each country, we construct an unbalanced panel of nonfinancial firms9 whose 
information is available for a least six consecutive years from 1986 to 2003. This 
strong requirement is a necessary condition since we lose one year of data in the 
construction of some variables (Appendix C), we lose another year of data because 
of the estimation of the model in first differences, and four-consecutive-year data is 
required in order to test for second-order serial correlation, as Arellano and Bond 
(1991) point out. We must test for second-order serial correlation because our 
estimation method, the GMM is based on this assumption. 
 
Three of the 12 Eurozone countries10 are excluded from our analysis for various 
reasons. As in La Porta et al. (2000), Luxembourg is removed from our sample 
because there are only a small number of firms listed on Luxembourg’s stock 
exchange. Greece is excluded because dividends are mandatory in that country. 
Finally, Finland had to be excluded because no sample with the abovementioned 
requirements could be selected. The structure of the samples, by number of firms, 
and number of observations per country, is provided in Table 1. As shown in Table 
2, the resultant unbalanced panel comprises 635 firms and 6,451 observations. Using 
an unbalanced panel for a long period (18 years) is the best way to correct for the 
survival bias caused by some firms being delisted and, consequently, dropped from 
the database. 
 
Table 1. Structure of the samples by countries 
 
Country 
Number of 
companies 
Percentage of 
companies 
Number of 
observations 
Percentage of 
observations 
Germany 110 17.32 1,153 17.87 
France 107 16.85 1,081 16.76 
Netherlands 91 14.33 943 14.62 
Spain 88 13.86 999 15.49 
Belgium 83 13.07 907 14.06 
                                                          
9We restrict our analysis to non-financial firms because financial firms have their own 
specificity. 
10The Eurozone currently comprises twelve countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. 
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Portugal 44 6.93 406 6.29 
Ireland 42 6.61 435 6.74 
Austria 38 5.98 309 4.79 
Italy 32 5.04 218 3.38 
Total 635 100.00 6,451 100.00 
 
The table shows extracted data from firms for which information is available for at 
least five consecutive years between 1986 and 2003. After removing the first-year 
data, used only to construct several variables (see, for instance, Appendix C), the 
resultant samples comprise 110 firms (1,153 observations) for Germany, 107 firms 
(1,081 observations) for France, 91 firms (943 observations) for the Netherlands, 88 
firms (999 observations) for Spain, 83 firms (907 observations) for Belgium, 44 
firms (406 observations) for Portugal, 42 firms (435 observations) for Ireland, 38 
firms (309 observations) for Austria and 32 firms (218 observations) for Italy. 
 
Table 2. Structure of the panel 
No. of annual 
observations 
per company 
Number of 
companies 
Percentage of 
companies 
Number of 
observations 
Percentage of observations 
18 4 0.63 72 1.12 
17 6 0.94 102 1.58 
16 42 6.61 672 10.42 
15 35 5.51 525 8.14 
14 56 8.82 784 12.15 
13 47 7.40 611 9.47 
12 46 7.24 552 8.56 
11 49 7.72 539 8.36 
10 57 8.98 570 8.84 
9 54 8.50 486 7.53 
8 63 9.92 504 7.81 
7 47 7.40 329 5.10 
6 60 9.45 360 5.58 
5 69 10.87 345 5.35 
Total 635 100.00 6,451 100.00 
 
Data from firms for which information is available for at least five consecutive years 
between 1986 and 2003 were extracted. After removing first-year data, used only to 
construct several variables (Appendix C), the resultant unbalanced panel comprises 
635 firms (6,451 observations). 
 
Table 3. Summary Statistics 
Panel A. Tobit model to solve dividends censure 
Variable 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
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PRit .38363 .34093 0.0000 1.0000 
(I/K)it .05651 .08761 -1.14290 .66487 
(CF/K)it .03952 .06031 -.72767 .40246 
(D/K)it .01271 .10017 -1.74563 .64275 
(S/K)it .00433 .02516 -.15017 .87898 
Panel B.Value model to predict catering 
Variable 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
(V/K)it .63668 .68147 .01405 9.2732 
Dit .09959 .10990 .0000 .82617 
(I/K)it .05651 .08761 -1.14290 .66487 
(CD/K)it .01399 .02217 0 .47295 
Panel C. Catering model of dividends 
Variable 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
FCFit .05140 .11449 -1.9768 1.1084 
Dit .09959 .10990 .0000 .82617 
NIit .02834 .06211 -.78456 .52176 
TANGit .28850 .18704 .00006 .98799 
SIit 12.6993 1.7785 8.4109 18.5011 
 
Table 3 provides summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum, and 
maximum) of the variables used in the construction of the dependent and 
explanatory variables. PRit denotes payout ratio, (I/K)it denotes investment, (CF/K)it 
is cash flow, (D/K)it and (S/K)it stand for the increment of debt and shares, 
respectively, (V/K)it is the firm’s value, Dit represents debt ratio, (CD/K)it denotes 
common dividends, FCFit is the free cash flow, NIit denotes net income, TANGit 
denotes tangible fixed assets, and SIit is size. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
The dependent variable in our model is the payout ratio, which is a censured variable 
in that some firms pay dividends, whereas others do not. Note that if we considered 
only the firms paying dividends, our results would be biased. To solve this problem, 
we predict the payout ratio using an explanatory model for this variable. We follow 
the model provided by Auerbach and Hasset (2003), which is based on the equality 
of sources and uses of funds, and we obtain the following Tobit model that provides 
us with a prediction of the payout ratio for each period from 1986 to 2003. 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) itititititit KSBKBKCFKICPR  +++++= //// 43210    (1)   
       
 with PRit = CPRit  if  CPRit >0, PRit = 0 if CPRit   ≤ 0 
where CPRit is a latent variable observed only when it is positive, whereas we know 
only that it is negative in the remainder of the cases. The explanatory variables for 
the payout ratio are: investment (Iit/Kit), cash flow (CFit/ Kit), increment of debt 
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(ΔBit/Kit), and increment of shares (ΔSit /Kit). All explanatory variables are scaled by 
the replacement value of total assets (Kit), calculated as explained in Appendix A.11 
 
Considering that CPRit follows a normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2, 
and letting 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  itititititit XKSBKBKCFKI =+++++ //// 43210 , 
 
then the logarithmic likelihood function of our model is 
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where the first term picks up the observations for which PRit> 0 (that is, observations 
for which the payout ratio is observable and, consequently, the density function is 
known), and where the second term refers to the remainder of the observations for 
which the payout ratio is unobservable, and we assume that the function (.) is 
distributed as N (0, 1).  
 
Table 4 provides summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum) of the payout ratios obtained by the maximum likelihood estimation of 
the Tobit model in (1). In addition, the estimation of a Probit model including the 
same set of explanatory variables allows us to check the capacity of prediction of the 
model in (1). As shown in the last column of Table 4, the percentages of correct 
classification are like those reported in previous studies. Additionally, the last row of 
the table displays the summary statistics of the new variable, CPRit, for which the 
problem of censure is already solved, and which will be the dependent variable in 
our model. 
 
Table 4. Summary statistics of the estimated payout ratios 
Variable 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Correct 
classification 
CPR86 .13018 .42393 -.57906 .72013 100.00 
CPR87 .30365 .17033 -.37441 .53203 87.50 
CPR88 .32129 .10967 .03271 .98574 83.66 
CPR89 .32494 .08542 -.35601 .52085 85.31 
CPR90 .38818 .07495 .05319 .68173 87.63 
CPR91 .40585 .04784 .07295 .58586 84.68 
CPR92 .45219 .13128 -.97013 .66520 82.51 
CPR93 .40188 .25357 -4.1673 .98977 75.29 
CPR94 .28988 .15638 -1.5087 .65421 77.16 
CPR95 .30949 .14072 -1.3781 .72779 77.46 
                                                          
11The subscript i refers to the firm and t refers to the time period. 
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CPR96 .34289 .13198 -.84888 .77060 78.96 
CPR97 .28807 .08769 -.47661 .46076 79.80 
CPR98 .27967 .09732 -.64811 .50091 78.63 
CPR99 .27442 .12663 -1.9449 .39907 77.27 
CPR00 .27979 .06908 -.29269 .47720 76.36 
CPR01 .38725 .15393 -1.0219 .94066 78.72 
CPR02 .35177 .41456 -5.1497 .60144 78.45 
CPR03 .35567 .22063 -2.2385 .89890 77.73 
CPR total .34023 .17056 -5.14974 .98977  
 
This table reports summary statistics of the estimated payout ratios. CPR03, for 
instance, is the payout ratio estimated by using a Tobit model for the year 2003 to 
solve the censure problem. Correct classification stands for the percentage of correct 
classification arising from a Probit model that includes the same set of explanatory 
variables. 
 
Explanatory Variables: 
According to the theories discussed in Section I.A, the explanatory variables to be 
entered into our basic model are: free cash flow, leverage, earnings, tangible fixed 
assets, and size. To capture the potential benefits of dividends as a mechanism to 
reduce the conflicts of interest between owners and managers with respect to the 
allocation of the firm’s free cash flow, our model incorporates a free cash flow index 
(FCFit), obtained from the interaction of cash flow with the inverse of the investment 
opportunities.12  
 
We compute a firm’s cash flow as CFit=NIAPDit+DEPit, where NIAPDit denotes net 
income after preferred dividends, and DEPit represents book depreciation expense. 
Investment opportunities are measured by means of Tobin’s q, calculated as qit= 
(Vit+PSit+MVLTDit+BVSTDit)/Kit, where Vit is the market value of common stock, PSit 
is the value of the firm’s outstanding preferred stock, MVLTDit represents the market 
value of the long-term debt (see Appendix B), and BVSTDit stands for the book value 
of short-term debt. 
 
To investigate whether there is a substitution, or a complementary relationship 
between debt and dividends, the debt ratio also enters our model. The debt ratio is 
defined as Dit=MVLTDit/(Vit+PSit+BVSTDit+MVLTDit). We use in the numerator the 
long-term debt, since most arguments in financial theory are related to this type of 
debt (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006).  
 
To test Lintner’s (1956) predictions about the relevance of a firm’s earnings for its 
dividend policy, we include the firm’s net income, NIit, in our model, measured as 
NIit=(PIit-ITXit)/Kit, where PIit encompasses all income before taxes, and ITXit, 
represents all taxes levied on income. 
                                                          
12Details about the interpretation of this index can be found in Miguel and Pindado (2001). 
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Finally, tangible fixed assets (TANGit) are computed as the net book value of 
property, plant, and equipment, scaled by the replacement value of total assets, and 
size (SIit) is the natural logarithm of the replacement value of total assets. 
 
In accordance with our aims, our model incorporates a variable capturing investor 
sentiment. Specifically, we propose the construction of a variable capturing 
investors´ sentiment at the firm-level that acts as a proxy for this catering effect. 
However, it is difficult to find a variable that captures and measures investor 
sentiment in an objective or definitive way, since sentiment is inherently 
subjective.13 Given this limitation, our measure should be regarded as a firm-level 
alternative to the variable originally proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2004b). The 
starting point for the calculation of this new variable is the following value model 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) it
it
it
it K
CDIVD
K
I
K
V
it
 ++++= 3210 ,                                        (2)           
 
where Iit represents investment (calculated as described in Appendix C), and CDIV it 
common dividends. If a firm’s market valuation is mainly explained by its 
investment, debt, and dividend decisions, the error term, it, captures what cannot be 
explained by these three financial decisions and, consequently, is our proxy for the 
firm’s investor sentiment.  
 
This variable represents our major contribution to the strand of literature pioneered 
by Baker and Wurgler (2004b). Note that these authors propose a measure of the 
market desire for dividend-paying stocks or, in other words, a measure at market-
level of the investor sentiment. Alternatively, we propose a measure of catering 
incentives at the firm level. If investor sentiment cannot be objectively measured 
because of its strong psychological component, our proposal is intended to overcome 
this limitation by proxying catering incentives through a variable built upon the 
residue of a value model. In this way, a firm’s market value is expected to be the 
result of its main financial decisions, as well as its investor sentiment regarding 
dividends. 
 
Table 5 provides summary statistics for the resultant catering variable for all years, 
obtained by cross-sectionally estimating the model in (2). The last row of the table 
displays the summary statistics of the resultant catering variable, CATit, which will 
enter our dividend model. 
 
Table 5. Summary statistics of the estimated catering variable 
Variable 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
CAT86 .0000 .00741 -.33190 .33741 
                                                          
13Baker and Wurgler (2006, pp. 1655) affirm that, “There are no definitive or 
uncontroversial measures for investor sentiment. 
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CAT87 .0000 .04132 -.51434 2.7364 
CAT88 .0000 .09847 -1.2738 3.9961 
CAT89 .0000 .11973 -1.3468 4.4887 
CAT90 .0000 .14999 -1.7954 7.5654 
CAT91 .0000 .12923 -.638263 4.9983 
CAT92 .0000 .10002 -.674895 3.1729 
CAT93 .0000 .09917 -1.1421 2.6332 
CAT94 .0000 .12363 -1.4792 4.4738 
CAT95 .0000 .15705 -2.1455 7.9613 
CAT96 .0000 .18841 -2.2141 5.2106 
CAT97 .0000 .17873 -1.8571 5.4364 
CAT98 .0000 .19392 -2.1252 6.9161 
CAT99 .0000 .23339 -1.8219 8.1605 
CAT00 .0000 .18831 -1.0222 7.6399 
CAT01 .0000 .12530 -1.0556 4.6773 
CAT02 .0000 .09525 -2.5362 3.4662 
CAT03 .0000 .10524 -3.2830 3.7791 
CAT total .0000 .59634 -3.2830 8.1605 
 
This table summarizes statistics of the resultant catering variable for all years, 
obtained by cross-sectionally estimating the value model in (2). The last row of the 
table displays the summary statistics of the resultant catering variable, CATit, which 
will enter our dividend model. Note that the catering variable comes from the error 
term of an explanatory value model, and therefore its mean is always zero. 
 
4. Empirical model and estimation method 
 
Using the dependent variable obtained as explained in Section II.B, and the 
traditional explanatory variables described in Section II.C, our basic model is as 
follows:  
ititititititit SIZETANGNIDFCFCPR  ++++++= 543210 ,             (3)                                 
where it is the random disturbance. 
 
The basic model in (3) can be easily extended to investigate the existence of the 
catering effect by including the variable CATit, leading to the following extended 
model: 
 
itititititititit CATSIZETANGNIDFCFCPR  +++++++= 6543210 ,            (4) 
  
Our models are estimated by the panel data methodology. Two issues are considered 
in making this choice. First, unlike cross-sectional analysis, panel data allow us to 
control for individual heterogeneity. This point is crucial in our study because the 
dividend decision is very closely related to the specificity of each firm. In fact, each 
firm has a different propensity to pay dividends, which could be regarded as 
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unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, to eliminate the risk of obtaining biased 
results, we control for such heterogeneity by modeling it as an individual effect, I, 
which is then eliminated by taking first differences of the variables. Consequently, 
the error term in our models, it , is split into four components.  
 
First, the above mentioned individual or firm-specific effect is presented as i. 
Second, dt measures the time-specific effect by the corresponding time dummy 
variables, so that we can control for the effects of macroeconomic variables on the 
dividend decision. Third, since our models are estimated using data from several 
countries, we also include country dummy variables (ci). Finally, vit represents the 
random disturbance. 
 
The second issue we address by using the panel data methodology is the endogeneity 
problem. The endogeneity problem is likely to arise in as far as the dependent 
variable (payout ratio) explains some explanatory variables. For instance, the payout 
ratio may explain leverage based on arguments used to justify reverse causality. In 
fact, Jensen et al. (1992), and Mod’d et al. (1998), among others, document a 
significant effect from dividends on debt.  
 
Additionally, there are reasons to expect size to be endogenous, since, as Ferris et al. 
(2006) point out, large dividend payers have continued to increase in size over the 
last 10 years. Consequently, endogeneity may be a problem in our models that must 
be controlled for. That is why our models have been estimated using instruments. 
Specifically, we use all the right-hand-side variables in the models lagged from t-1 
to t-4 as instruments for the equations in differences, and t-1 for the equations in 
levels, as Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest, when deriving the system estimator 
used in this paper. 
 
Finally, we check for potential misspecification of the models. First, we use the 
Hansen J statistic of over-identifying restrictions to test for the absence of 
correlation between the instruments and the error term. Tables 6 and 7 show that the 
instruments used is valid. Second, we use the m2 statistic, developed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991), to test for lack of second-order serial correlation in the first-difference 
residual.  
 
Tables 6 and 7 show that there is no problem of second-order serial correlation in 
our models (see m2). Note that although there is first-order serial correlation (see 
m1), this is caused by the first-difference transformation of the model and, 
consequently, it does not represent a specification problem of the models. Third, the 
results shown in Tables 6 and 7 provide good outcomes for the following three Wald 
tests: z1 is a test of the joint significance of the reported coefficients; z2 is a test of the 
joint significance of the time dummies; and z3 is a test of the joint significance of the 
country dummies. 
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Table 6. Estimation results of the basic and extended models 
 I II 
Constant -.05732* (.018832) -.02273** (.01367) 
FCFit .38534* (.01989) .44124* (.01211) 
Dit .23181* (.01269) .22471* (.00937) 
NIit .22608* (.03379) .07396* (.02011) 
TANGit .21719* (.01167) .21248* (.00925) 
Sit .01955* (.00165) .01682* (.00121) 
CATit  .01781 (.00103) 
z1 431.30 (5) 769.21 (5) 
z2 1277.31 (16) 2250.85 (16) 
z3 35.27 (8) 64.34 (8) 
m1 -3.41 -3.40 
m2 -1.24 -0.98 
Hansen 428.51 (397) 505.19 (510) 
 
The regressions are performed by using the panel described in Table 2. The variables 
are defined in Table 3. The remainder of the information needed to read this table is 
as follows: i) Heteroscedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses. 
ii) *,**, and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively; iii) 
z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of the joint significance of the reported coefficients, of the 
time dummies, and of the country dummies, respectively, asymptotically distributed as 
χ2 under the null of no significance, with degrees of freedom in parentheses; iv) mi is a 
serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation; v) Hansen is a test of the 
over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no 
correlation between the instruments and the error term, degrees of freedom in 
parentheses. 
 
Table 7. Estimation results of the moderating role of certain firm characteristics 
              I     II III 
Constant 
.0484*** 
(.02764) 
-.06136** 
(.02651) 
.08452 (.02806) 
FCFit .40301* 
(.01329) 
.39978* (.01285) 
.41178* 
(.01399) 
Dit .23441* 
(.01239) 
.37364* (.01391) 
.21581* 
(.01224) 
NIit .10179* 
(.02114) 
.13973* (.02194) 
.05817* 
(.02238) 
TANGit .27127* 
(.01118) 
.27764* (.01167) 
.25512* 
(.01145) 
Sit .02595* 
(.00220) 
.03002* (.00219) 
.02414* 
(.00227) 
CATit 
.00446 (.00273) 
-.13649* 
(.00584) 
.01104* 
(.00135) 
    Payout and Firm’s Catering 
 
122 
CATitDVit .02325* 
(.00330) 
.18262* 
(.00647) 
.06480* 
(.06480) 
t  25.07 14.75 
z1 618.18 (7) 586.61 (7) 411.58 (7) 
z2 1702.17 (16) 1674.44 (16) 1552.86 (16) 
z3 146.34 (8) 131.17 (8) 166.17 (8) 
m1 -3.39 -3.42 -3.39 
m2 -.80 -0.43 -1.09 
Hansen 483.96 (502) 481.59 (502) 475.67 (502) 
 
The regressions are performed using the panel described in Table 2. DVit is a dummy 
variable that takes the following values: a) 1 if the level of liquid assets is above the 
sample median, and 0 otherwise in Column I; b) 1 if Tobin’s q is higher than unity, 
and 0 otherwise in Column II; c) 1 if the free cash flow is above the sample median, 
and 0 otherwise in Column III. The remainder of the variables is defined in Table 3.  
 
The remainder of the information needed to read this table is as follows: i) 
Heteroscedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses. ii) *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively; iii) t is the t-
statistic for the linear restriction test under the null hypothesis of no significance; iv) 
z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of the joint significance of the reported coefficients, of the 
time dummies, and of the country dummies, respectively, asymptotically distributed as 
χ2 under the null of no significance, with degrees of freedom in parentheses; v) mi is a 
serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation; vi) Hansen is a test of the 
over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no 
correlation between the instruments and the error term, degrees of freedom in 
parentheses. 
 
5. Results 
 
In this section, we first present the results of our basic model in Eq. (3), which 
includes the explanatory variables that have been traditionally considered 
determinants of a firm’s payout ratio. We then extend this basic model by 
incorporating a variable capturing investor sentiment into model (4). Finally, we test 
the implications of the catering theory by means of several firm characteristics, three 
in particular:  liquid assets, investment opportunities, and free cash flow. 
 
Results of the basic and extended models: 
The results for the GMM estimation of our basic model in (3) are provided in 
Column I of Table 6. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the level of a firm’s free cash 
flow positively affects its payout ratio. Therefore, consistent with Jensen’s (1986) 
theory, we find that firms with higher levels of free cash flow are encouraged to pay 
more dividends to restrain manager discretion, and to prevent them from 
overinvesting. In agreement with Jensen (1989), the coefficient of leverage is 
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positive, and suggests that debt and dividends are complementary agency-cost 
control mechanisms.  
 
Therefore, our evidence supports Hypothesis 2b, according to which a new issue of 
debt requires a higher dividend payment to limit managerial discretion over the new 
funds and, consequently, to avoid overinvestment in the firm. The positive 
relationship between a firm’s earnings and its payout ratio predicted in Hypothesis 3 
is confirmed by our results. Consistent with Lintner (1956), firms in our sample 
increase their payout ratios when their earnings rise, to get a stable pattern of 
dividends and to avoid dividend cuts.  
 
Regarding the nature of the firm’s assets, Hypothesis 4b holds, which supports the 
above-mentioned results concerning the complementary relationship between debt 
and dividends. That is, firms with more tangible fixed assets are more leveraged and, 
consequently, maintain larger payout ratios to control the new funds. Finally, and as 
expected, the positive coefficient on size supports Hypothesis 5, according to which 
larger firms pay higher dividends. Column II of Table 6 presents the results of the 
GMM estimation of Model (4). As shown in this table, the signs of the coefficients 
of the variables included in the basic model remain identical once the catering effect, 
CATit, is entered the model. In short, a firm’s payout ratio is positively affected by its 
level of free cash flow, its leverage, its net income, its level of tangible fixed assets, 
and its size.  
 
Regarding the influence of a firm’s investor sentiment on its payout ratio, the 
positive coefficient of the catering variable confirms Hypothesis 6. Consistent with 
Baker and Wurgler (2004b), this finding highlights the link between the propensity 
to pay dividends and catering incentives. In other words, our result suggests that 
firms cater to their investors’ preferences such that they are more prone to increase 
payout ratios when investors exhibit preference for dividends. This evidence 
provides empirical support for the catering model previously documented in US 
firms by Baker and Wurgler (2004a, b), and Li and Lie (2006), among others. 
Moreover, this result confirms that, as suggested by Von Eije and Megginson 
(2008), delving into the intricacies of measuring the catering effect may lead the 
catering theory to become as relevant in European countries as it is in the US. 
 
The moderating role of some firm characteristics: 
After corroborating the existence of a catering effect with our results, we go a step 
further, and investigate whether certain firm characteristics moderate this effect. We 
then propose a test of the moderating role played by three features – namely, liquid 
assets, investment opportunities, and free cash flow. It is worth noting that, as far as 
we know, there is no prior evidence supporting this view, and providing empirical 
support for this issue is thus one of the major contributions of this paper. Despite the 
lack of previous evidence, there are strong arguments that lead us to contend that 
investor preference for dividends changes in accordance with the above-mentioned 
characteristics. 
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First, Pinheiro et al. (2006) extend the model of Fama and French (2001) by adding 
a measure of liquid assets, and they find that firms are more likely to pay dividends 
if they have more liquid assets. Furthermore, these authors’ results indicate that the 
decision to pay dividends depends directly on how much importance a firm’s 
managers attach to shareholder preferences and on the firm’s level of liquid assets. 
This leads us to expect that a firm’s liquid assets and its investor sentiment about 
dividends could be related. Specifically, we expect investor preference for dividends 
to increase with a firm’s liquid assets. 
 
Second, it has been widely documented that dividends convey information about a 
firm’s prospects (Bhattacharya, 1979; John and Williams, 1985; Miller and Rock, 
1985). According to signaling arguments, investors are optimistic about firms 
initiating or increasing dividends in that they interpret such a decision as meaning 
that there are valuable investment opportunities that guarantee the future distribution 
of such funds. Additionally, the managerial discretion associated with a high level of 
intangibles in the firm may make dividends more desirable for investors, to control 
for such discretion. Overall, this leads us to expect investor preference for dividends 
to be stronger for firms with valuable investment opportunities. 
 
Third, as commented before the free cash flow theory proposes that dividends lessen 
the agency costs deriving from the conflicts of interest between managers and 
owners with respect to a firm’s free cash flow. This theory suggests a positive 
relationship between dividends and the level of free cash flow, a relation that is 
confirmed by the results presented in the previous section. Based on this result and 
given the proven role of dividends in controlling for overinvestment processes, we 
expect investor preference for dividends to be stronger for firms with high levels of 
free cash flow. 
 
To investigate whether these firm characteristics moderate the catering effect, we 
propose the following model to be estimated 
 
( ) ititititititititit DVCATSIZETANGNIDFCFCPR  ++++++++= 6543210      (5) 
 
where DVit is a dummy variable constructed according to the firm’s level of liquid 
assets, investment opportunities, and free cash flow. It is worth noting that in all 
cases whenever the dummy variable equals one and both parameters (6 and ) are 
significant, a linear restriction test is needed to know whether their sum (6+) is 
significantly different from zero. The null hypothesis to be tested in these cases is 
the hypothesis of no significance, H0: 6+=0. Column I of Table 7 reports the 
results of the model, including the interaction of catering with liquid assets.14 In this 
                                                          
14This variable stands for money available for use in the normal operations of the firm, 
scaled by the replacement value of total assets; it represents the most liquid of all of the 
firm’s assets. 
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case, DVit takes value one if the firm’s level of liquid assets is above the sample 
median, and zero otherwise. In this way, the coefficient of the catering variable is 6 
for firms with low levels of liquid assets (since DVit takes value zero), and 6+ for 
firms with high levels of liquid assets (since DVit takes value one). As shown in the 
table, there is no effect from a firm’s investor sentiment on its payout ratio when the 
firm has low liquid assets (6 not significantly different from zero).  
 
However, the effect is positive and significant for firms with high levels of liquid 
assets (6+==0.02325, significantly different from zero), which confirms that, as 
expected, investor preference for dividends increases with liquid assets. That is, our 
evidence suggests that investor demand for dividends translates into higher payout 
ratios only in those firms with high liquid assets, whereas firms with low liquid 
assets do not seem to cater to investor preferences. 
 
The interaction of the catering effect and investment opportunities is tested in the 
model presented in Column II of Table 7. In this model, DVit takes value one if the 
firm’s Tobin’s q is higher than one, and zero otherwise. As shown in the table, the 
catering effect is negative in firms with non-valuable investment opportunities (6=-
0.13649), whereas this effect turns positive for firms with valuable investment 
opportunities (6+=0.04613, significantly different from zero, see t).  
 
These results point out that the expected catering effect clearly manifests itself when 
there are prospects for the firm, which affords managers the opportunity to exploit 
the potential divergence between inside and market expectations, and which makes 
dividends more valuable to investors. In contrast, non-valuable investment 
opportunities prevent firms from catering to investor sentiment about dividends, 
probably because the lack of positive NPV projects may lead to not being able to 
maintain high payout ratios in the future.  
 
Finally, we investigate the interaction between the catering effect and the free cash 
flow by estimating the model presented in Column III of Table 7. In this case, DVit 
takes value one if the firm’s free cash flow is above the sample median, and zero 
otherwise. As can be seen in the table, the coefficient of the catering variable is 
higher for firms with high levels of free cash flow (6+=0.07584, significantly 
different from zero, see t) than for firms with low levels of free cash flow 
(6=0.01104). Therefore, it seems that catering incentives (i.e., investor preference 
for dividend-paying) manifests more strongly in firms with high levels of free cash 
flow, in which dividends are much more valuable as an agency-cost control 
mechanism. This evidence again supports Jensen’s (1986) theory. 
 
Overall, this evidence provides an excellent robustness check for the results of the 
basic and extended models, since the sign of the coefficients of both the traditional 
explanatory variables, and the catering variable remain identical once we control for 
the moderating role of certain firm characteristics. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
This paper provides a test of the predictions of the catering theory of dividends by 
proposing a new approach for analyzing the effect that investor sentiment exerts on 
corporate dividend policy. Accordingly, a traditional dividend model is extended to 
incorporate an original measure of the catering effect at the firm-level, proxied by 
the error term of a market valuation model. 
 
Our results show that investor sentiment impacts payout ratios in Eurozone member 
countries after controlling for traditional determinants of dividends, such as the free 
cash flow, leverage, earnings, tangible fixed assets, and size. This finding seems to 
indicate that dividend policies are driven to some extent by investor sentiment, thus 
revealing the desire of firm managers to cater to such preferences. Therefore, our 
evidence provides empirical support for a psychological component in the decision 
to pay in Eurozone firms, and it thus provides empirical support for the catering 
model.  
 
Furthermore, this study contributes to an understanding of the implications of 
catering incentives for dividend policies by examining the moderating role played by 
certain firm characteristics. Our findings corroborate that the way in which investors 
appreciate dividend payments depends on the firm’s liquid assets, investment 
opportunities, and free cash flow.  
 
First, investor preference for dividends translates into higher payout ratios only in 
those firms with high liquid assets.  
 
Second, investor sentiment positively impacts the payout ratio of only those firms 
with valuable investment opportunities, for which investors’ manifest stronger 
expectations about receiving higher dividends.  
 
Finally, a firm’s free cash flow is a driving force behind investor preference for 
dividends, which is stronger in firms with higher levels of free cash flow in that 
dividends are probably much more valuable as a mechanism to avoid 
overinvestment. 
 
An interesting question that is left unanswered by this research is what drives the 
changes in investors' preferences for dividends before different economic cycles. We 
leave this as an interesting topic for future research. 
 
Appendix A-Replacement Value of Total Assets 
 
The replacement value of total assets is obtained as follows: 
 ( )itititit BFTARFK −+=   
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where RFit is the replacement value of tangible fixed assets, TAit is the book value of 
total assets, and BFit is the book value of tangible fixed assets. The latter two variables 
are obtained from the firm’s balance sheet and the first is calculated according to the 
proposals of Perfect and Wiles (1994) 
I+
+1
+1
RF=RF it
it
t
1-itit 







  
for t>t0, and RFit0=BFit0, where t0 is the first year of the chosen period, in our case 1986. 
On the other hand, δit=Dit/BFit and t=(GCGPt-GCGPt-1)/GCGPt-1, where GCGPt is the 
growth of capital goods prices extracted from the Main Economic Indicators, published 
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
 
Appendix B-Market Value of Long-term debt 
 
The market value of long-term debt, MVLTDit, is obtained from the following 
formula: 
BVLTD
i+1
l+1
=MVLTD it
l
it
it 





  
where BVLTDit is the book value of the long-term debt, il is the rate of interest of the 
long-term debt reported in the OECD-Main Economic Indicators and lit is the average 
cost of long-term debt, defined as lit=(IPLTDit/BVLTDit), where IPLTDit is the interest 
payable on the long-term debt, which is obtained by distributing the interest payable 
between the short and long-term debt depending on interest rates. That is, 
IP
BVLTDi+BVSTDi
BVLTDi
=IPLTD it
itlits
itl
it   
where IPit is the interest payable, is is the rate of interest of the short-term debt, also 
reported in Main Economic Indicators, and BVSTDit is the book value of the short-term 
debt. 
 
Appendix C-Investment 
 
Investment is calculated according to the proposal by Lewellen and Badrinath (1997) 
as follows: 
Let FAit be the gross book value of the tangible fixed assets of the period t, Rit the 
gross book value of the old assets retired during the year t, ABDit the accumulated 
book depreciation for the year t, and BDit the book depreciation expense corresponding 
to year t. We then have the following equalities: 
FAit=FAit-1+Iit-Rit            
(A.1) 
ABDit=ABDit-1+BDit-Rit                          
(A.2) 
 If we solve Eq. A.2 for Rit and substitute it into Eq. A.1, we obtain A.3, 
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FAit=FAit-1+Iit+ABDit-ABDit-1-BDit                          
(A.3)  
Realigning terms, Eq. A.3 is transformed into expression A.4, 
FAit-ABDit=FAit-1-ABDit-1+Iit-BDit                         
(A.4) 
As for FAit-ABDit=NFit, i.e., the net fixed assets, the former equation can be rewritten 
more compactly as in Eq. A.5, 
NFit=NFit-1+Iit-BDit  ,                                                                            
(A.5) 
from which we obtain the value of investment 
Iit=NFit-NFit-1+BDit .                                  
(A.6) 
 
References:   
 
Aivazian, V., Booth, L. and Cleary, S. 2003. Do emerging market firms follow different  
dividend policies than firms in the U.S: evidence from 8 emerging markets. Journal 
of Financial Research, 26, 371-387. 
Allen, F., Bernardo, W. and Welch, I. 2000. A theory of dividends based on tax clientele.  
Journal of Finance, 55, 2499-2536.  
Allen, F. and Michaely, R. 2003, Payout Policy, in G. Constantinides, M. Harris, and R.  
Stulz Eds., Handbook of the Economics of Finance, 1A, Amsterdam, Elsevier. 
Amihud, Y. and Li, K. 2006. The declining information content of dividend announcements  
and the effect of institutional holdings. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 41, 637-660. 
Arellano, M. and Bond, S. 1991. Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo  
evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies, 
58, 277-297.  
Auerbach, A. and Hassett, K. 2003. On the marginal source of investment funds. Journal of  
Public Economics, 87, 205-232. 
Baker, M. and Stein, J. 2003. Market Liquidity as a Sentiment Indicator. Journal of  
Financial Markets, 7, 271-299. 
Baker, M. and Wurgler, J. 2004a. A catering theory of dividends. Journal of Finance, 59,  
1125-1165.  
Baker, M. and Wurgler, J. 2004b. Appearing and disappearing dividends: The link to  
catering incentives. Journal of Financial Economics, 73, 271-288. 
Baker, M., Stein, J. and Wurgler, J. 2003. When Does the Market Matter? Stock Prices and  
the Investment of Equity-Dependent Firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 
969-1006.  
Baker, M. and Wurgler, J. 2006. Investor Sentiment and the Cross-section of Stock  
Returns. Journal of Finance, 61, 1645-1680. 
Banerjee, S., Gatchev, V. and Spindt, P. 2007. Stock Market Liquidity and Firm Dividend  
Policy. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 42, 369-398. 
Barberis, N., Shleifer, A. and Wurgler, J. 2005. Comovement. Journal of Financial  
Economics, 75, 283-317. 
Barberis, N. A. Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. 1998. A model of investor sentiment. Journal of  
Financial Economics, 49, 307-343. 
Barclay, M., Smith, C. and Watts, R. 1995. The determinants of corporate leverage and  
 M. E. Duarte Neves  
 
129 
dividend policies. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 7, 4-19.  
Bathia, D. and Bredin, D. 2013. An examination of investor sentiment effect on G7 stock  
market returns. The European Journal of Finance, 19(9), 909-937. 
Benartzi, S., Roni, M. and Thaler, R. 1997. Do changes in dividends signal the future or the  
past? Journal of Finance, 52, 1007-1034. 
Bhattacharya, S. 1979. Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and The Bird in the  
Hand Fallacy. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 259-270.  
Black, F. and Scholes, M. 1974. The effects of dividend yield and dividend policy on  
common stock prices and returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 1, 1-22. 
Blundell, R. and Bond, S. 1998. Initial conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic  
Panel Data Models. Journal of Econometrics, 87, 115-144. 
Boot, A., Gopalan, R. and Thakor, A. 2008. Market Liquidity, Investor Participation, and  
Managerial Autonomy: Why do Firms Go Private? Journal of Finance, 63, 2013-
2059. 
Boudoukh, J., Michaely, R., Richardson, M. and Roberts, M. 2007. On the implications of  
measuring payout yield: Implications for empirical asset pricing. Journal of Finance, 
62, 877-915. 
Brav, A., Graham, J., Harvey, C. and Michaely, R. 2005. Payout policy in the 21st Century.  
Journal of Financial Economics, 77, 483-527. 
Bulan, L., Subramanian, N. and Tunlu, L. 2007. On the timing of dividend initiations.  
Financial Management, 36, 31-65. 
Chakraborty, A., Kazarosian, M. and Trahan, E. 1999. Uncertainty in Executive  
Compensation and Capital Investment: A Panel Study. Financial Management, 28, 
126-139. 
Chaplinsky, S. and Niehaus, G. 1993. Do Inside Ownership and Leverage Share Common  
Determinants? Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 32, 61-78. 
Chen, S.S. and Ho, K. 1997. Market Response to Product-Strategy and Capital- Expenditure  
Announcements in Singapore: Investment Opportunities and Free Cash Flow. 
Financial Management, 26, 82-88. 
Coval, J., Stein, J and Baker, M. 2008. Corporate Financing Decisions When Investors Take  
the Path of Least Resistance. Journal of Financial Economics, 84, 266-298. 
Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D. and Subrahmanyam, A. 1998. Investor Psychology and Security  
Market Under-and Over-reactions. Journal of Finance, 53, 1839-1885. 
DeAngelo, H. and DeAngelo, L. 2006. The irrelevance of the MM dividend irrelevance  
Theorem. Journal of Financial Economics, 79, 293-316. 
DeAngelo, H. and DeAngelo, L. 2007. Payout policy pedagogy: What matters and why.  
European Financial Management, 13, 11-27. 
DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L. and Skinner, D. 2004. Are dividends disappearing? Dividend  
concentration and the consolidation of earnings. Journal of Financial Economics, 
72, 425-456. 
DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L. and Stulz, R. 2004. Dividend Policy, Agency Costs and Earned  
Equity. University of Southern California, NBER Working paper. 
De Jong, A., Duca, E. and Dutordoir, M. 2013. Do Convertible Bond Issuers Cater to  
Investor Demand? Financial Management, 42, 41-78.  
Del Brio, E., Perote, J. and Pindado, J. 2003. Measuring the impact of corporate investment 
Announcements on share prices: the Spanish experience. Journal of Business, 
Finance and Accounting, 30, 715-747. 
Denis, D. and Osobov, I. 2008. Why Do Firms Pay Dividends? International Evidence on  
the Determinants of Dividend Policy. Journal of Financial Economics, 89, 62-82. 
    Payout and Firm’s Catering 
 
130 
Douglas, A. 2001. Managerial replacement and corporate financial policy with endogenous  
manager-specific value. Journal of Corporate Finance, 7, 25-52. 
Easterbrook, F. 1984. Two agency-cost explanations of dividends. American Economic  
Review, 74, 650-659. 
Eckbo, B. and Verma, S. 1994. Managerial share ownership, voting power, and cash  
dividend policy. Journal of Corporate Finance, 1, 33-62.  
Edmans, A., García, D. and Norli, O. 2007. Sports sentiment and stock returns. Journal of  
Finance, 62, 1967-1998. 
Fama, F. and French, K. 2001. Disappearing dividends: Changing firm characteristics or  
lower propensity to pay? Journal of Financial Economics, 60, 3-44. 
Fangjian, F. 2010. Overinvestment and the Operating Performance of SEO Firms.  
Financial Management, 39, 249-272. 
Ferreira, M., Massa, M. and Matos, P. 2010. Dividend Clienteles Around the World  
Evidence from Institutional Holdings. University of Southern California, Working 
Paper. 
Ferris, S., Sen, N. and Yui, H. 2006. God Save the Queen and her dividends: Corporate  
payouts in the UK.  Journal of Business, 79, 1149-1173. 
Ferris S., Jayaraman, N. and Sabherwal, S. 2009. Catering effects in corporate dividend  
policy: the international evidence. Journal of Banking and Finance, 33, 1730-1738. 
Grossman, S. and Hart, O. 1980. Takeover bids, the free – rider problem, and the theory of  
the corporation. Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 42-64. 
Harris, M. and Raviv, A. 1991. The theory of capital structure. Journal of Finance, 46, 297- 
355.  
Hoberg, G. and Prabhala, N. 2009. Disappearing dividends, catering, and risk. Review of  
Financial Studies, 22, 79-116.  
Holder, M., Langrehr, F. and Hexter, L. 1998. Dividend Policy Determinants. An  
Investigation of the Influences of Stakeholder Theory. Financial Management, 27, 
73-82. 
Hong, H. and Stein, J. 1999. A Unified Theory of underreaction, momentum trading and  
overreaction in asset markets. Journal of Finance, 54, 2143-2184. 
Jegadeesh, N. and Titman, S. 2001. Profitability of Momentum Strategies. An Evaluation of  
Alternative Explanations. Journal of Finance, 56, 699-720. 
Jensen, M. 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers.  
American Economic Review, 76, 323-329. 
Jensen, M. 1989. Eclipse of the public corporation. Harvard Business Review, 89, 61-84. 
Jensen, G., Solberg, D. and Zorn, T.1992. Simultaneous Determination of Insider  
Ownership, Debt, and Dividend Policies. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 27, 247-263.  
John, K. and Williams, J. 1985. Dividends, dilution, and taxes: A signalling equilibrium.  
Journal of Finance, 40, 1053-1070. 
John, K. and Senbet, L. 1998. Corporate Governance and Board Effectiveness. Journal of  
Banking and Finance, 22, 371-403. 
Koch, A. and Sun, A. 2004. Dividend changes and the persistence of past earnings  
Changes. Journal of Finance, 59, 2093-2116. 
Kumar, A. and Lee, C. 2006. Retail Investor Sentiment and Return Comovements. Journal  
of Finance, 61, 2451-2486. 
Kuo, J.M., Philip, D. and Zhang, Q. 2013. What drives the disappearing dividends  
phenomenon? Journal of Banking & Finance, 37, 3499-3514. 
Kurov, A. 2008. Investor Sentiment, Trading Behavior and Informational Efficiency in  
 M. E. Duarte Neves  
 
131 
Index Futures Markets. Financial Review, 43, 107-127. 
Lamont, O. and Stein, J. 2006. Investor sentiment and corporate finance: Micro and Macro.  
American Economic Review, 96, 147-151. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. 2000. Investor Protection and  
Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 3-28. 
Lewellen, W. and Badrinath, S. 1997. On the measurement of Tobin´s Q. Journal of  
Financial Economics, 44, 77-122. 
Li, K. and Zhao, X. 2008. Asymmetric Information and Dividend Policy. Financial  
Management, 37, 673-694. 
Li, W. and Lie, E. 2006. Dividends changes and catering incentives. Journal of Financial  
Economics, 80, 293-308. 
Lintner, J. 1956. Distribution of incomes of corporations among dividends, retained  
earnings, and taxes. American Economic Review, 46, 97-113. 
Manconi, A. and Massa, M. 2013. A Servant to Many Masters: Competing Shareholder  
Preferences and Limits to Catering. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
48, 1693-1716.  
Miguel, A. and Pindado, J. 2001. Determinants of Capital Structure: New Evidence from  
Spanish Panel Data. Journal of Corporate Finance, 7, 77-99. 
Miguel, A., Pindado, J. and Torre, C. 2005. How do entrenchment and expropriation  
phenomena affect control mechanisms? Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 13, 505-516. 
Miller, M. and F. Modigliani, 1961, “Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares”,  
Journal of Business 34, 411-433. 
Miller, M. and Rock, K. 1985. Dividend policy under asymmetric information. Journal of  
Finance, 40, 1031-1051.  
Moh’d, M., Perry, L. and Rimbey, J. 1995. An Investigation of the Dynamic Relationship  
between Agency Theory and Dividend Policy. Financial Review, 30, 367-385. 
Moh’d, M., Perry, L. and Rimbey, J. 1998. The Impact of Ownership Structure on  
Corporate Debt Policy: A Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analysis. Financial Review, 
33, 85-98. 
Morgado, A. and Pindado, J. 2003. The underinvestment and overinvestment hypothesis: an  
analysis using panel data.  European Financial Management, 9, 163-177. 
Nissim, D. and Ziv, A. 2001. Dividend Changes and Future Profitability. Journal of  
Finance, 56, 2111-2134. 
Perfect, S. and Wiles, K. 1994. Alternative constructions of Tobin´s Q: an empirical  
Comparison. Journal of Empirical Finance, 1, 313-341. 
Pinheiro, M., Deniz, I. and Paula, A. 2006. Liquidity and Payout Policy. Princeton  
University Working Paper. 
Polk, C. and Sapienza, P. 2004. The real effects of investor sentiment. NBER Working  
Paper. 
Polk, C. and Sapienza, P. 2009. The Stock Market and Corporate Investment: A Test of  
Catering Theory. Review of Financial Studies, 22, 187-217. 
Ritter, J. 2003. Behavioral Finance. Pacific-Basian Finance Journal, 11, 429-437. 
Ross, S. 1977. The determination of financial structure: the incentive signalling approach.  
Bell Journal of Economics, 8, 23-40. 
Rozeff, M. 1982. Growth, beta and agency costs as determinants of dividend payout  
Ratios. Journal of Financial Research, 5, 249-259. 
Scott, J. 1977. Bankruptcy secured debt and optimal capital structure. Journal of Finance,  
32, 1-19. 
    Payout and Firm’s Catering 
 
132 
Shefrin, H. and Statman, M. 1984. Explaining investor preference for cash dividends.  
Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 253-282. 
Skinner, D. 2008. The Evolving Relation between Earnings, Dividends, and Stock  
Repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics, 87, 582-609. 
Subrahmanyam, A. 2007. Behavioural Finance: A Review and Synthesis. European  
Journal of Financial Management, 14, 12-29. 
Thaler, R. and Shefrin, H. 1981. An economic theory of self-control. Journal of Political  
Economy, 89, 392-406. 
Tetlock, P. 2007. Giving Content to Investor Sentiment: The Role of Media in the  
Stock Market. Journal of Finance, 62, 1139-1168. 
Twite, G. 2001. Capital structure choices and taxes: evidence from the Australian dividend  
imputation tax system. International Review of Finance, 2, 217-234. 
Vieira, E. 2011. Investor sentiment and the market reaction to dividend news: European  
Evidence. Managerial Finance, 37, 1213-1245. 
Von Eije, H. and Megginson, W. 2008. Dividends and share repurchases in the European  
Union. Journal of Financial Economics, 89, 347-374. 
Wang, Y., Keswani, A. and Taylor, S. 2006. The Relationships between Sentiment Returns  
and Volatility. International Journal of Forecasting, 22, 109-123. 
Zwiebel, J. 1996. Dynamic capital structure under managerial entrenchment.  American  
Economic Review, 86, 1197-1215. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
